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Democratic Communication and the Role of Special Advisers in Northern 
Ireland's Consociational Government 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper examines the role of ministerial Special Advisers in Northern Ireland's 
government communication. Using data gathered from elite interviews with Special 
Advisers, Government Information Officers and political journalists, we argue that 
the role of the Special Adviser is influenced by the post-conflict political culture in 
Northern Ireland and the consociational structure of government. The paper suggests 
that current theorising of the role of Special Advisers in democratic societies must 
also take account of how they operate within mandatory coalitions such as those 
found in Northern Ireland. We call for more research into their communication role in 
post-conflict consociational environments.  
 
Key Words: Special Advisers, consociational government, post-conflict societies, 
Northern Ireland 
 
1. Introduction, theory and context 
 
This paper examines the role and relationships of 'Westminster style' Special Advisers 
(SpAds) working in Northern Ireland’s post-conflict, mandatory power-sharing 
government and assesses their impact within broader debates about government 
communication in democratic societies. The 'Westminster style' SpAd is a temporary 
civil servant who is appointed by a government minister to assist him/her in a 
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political capacity, while working within a civil service department (Gay, 2000). Most 
of the research on SpAds has been carried out in the UK Westminster administration 
or other majoritarian democracies (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010a). There is a dearth of 
research into the micro-level communicative relationships of SpAds in more complex 
political environments and this leaves a significant knowledge gap in respect to how 
SpAds impact on government communication in other political systems. Our 
investigation is timely, therefore, in explaining the role of SpAds within mandatory 
coalitions, at a time when consociationalism is increasingly advocated as a solution to 
the fragmented conflict ridden societies such as sub-Saharan Africa, and has already 
emerged as a political system in divided societies such as those in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Switzerland, India, Macedonia, Lebanon, Belgium and Northern Ireland 
(Lemarchand, 2007). 
 
Data was gathered via in-depth elite interviews with SpAds, Government Information 
Officers (GIOs), and political journalists working in Northern Ireland. Our findings 
suggest that while there are various similarities to the role SpAds play in other 
polities, SpAds in post-conflict consociational governments such as Northern 
Ireland’s play a more complex role to that which we see in 'normal' majoritarian 
democracies, and the differences shine through most clearly in their communication 
activities.  In this paper, we consider why our findings might vary from those found 
in other political systems and thus contribute to both the normative and critical 
debates on SpAds in democratic societies. We further consider what our findings  
mean for current theory on SpAds and suggest that more comparative research is 
required into politically and constitutionally complex systems in order to more fully 
understand the role of this important political role in contemporary democracies.  
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1.1 Special Advisers and the professionalisation of government communication 
 
Professionalisation in the government communication context is characterised as the 
increased employment of 'experts' or professionals in communication, and the use of 
public relations strategies which entail: "skills specific to the media and persuasive 
communications" (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999:213). This is considered necessary 
since the media is the main vehicle of citizens' political knowledge (Gelders et al., 
2007). It is also clear that the process of government communication is affected by 
micro-level interactions with journalists in this professional mediatised environment 
(Davis, 2002; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). These source-media relationships are 
viewed as oscillating between contest, reciprocity, and cautious cooperation, in the 
quest for each group to set the media, and therefore the public, agenda (Franklin, 
2004; Larsson, 2002; Moloney, 2006). 
 
In the UK (and Northern Ireland) the flow of information on government matters to 
the media is managed on a day to day basis by GIOs, and increasingly so, also by 
SpAds. In the UK and other Westminster style civil service systems, the role of the 
GIO is designed to be apolitical, in that they assist the government of whichever 
political persuasion in an impartial civil servant capacity, to communicate with the 
public/media (Rice et al., 2013). These communicators are bound by a Code of 
Conduct where upholding political impartiality is key (Cabinet Office, 2010a). 
SpAds, on the other hand, are personally appointed by government ministers but paid 
for out of civil service funds and in the UK legislatures they are bound by a specific 
SpAd Code of Conduct (Cabinet Office, 2010b). This differs from the traditional civil 
service Code of Conduct, in that SpAds are not required to be politically neutral and 
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are not recruited and appointed via the merit principle, their appointment is, in fact, 
usually the result of the minister's personal preference (Gay, 2000). The role and 
impact of SpAds on government communications is therefore an important issue for 
Westminster style democracies, given the civil service ethos that communication 
should be apolitical, transparent, and provide a public service by ensuring citizens 
have adequate access to information on public policy issues in a democratic society 
(Fairbanks et al., 2007; Somerville and Ramsey, 2012). There are, therefore, also 
broader democratic concerns surrounding how information from government is 
controlled by political actors and used strategically to exercise power (Bennett, 2001).  
 
Research into SpAds in democratic societies falls into various categories. Firstly, 
there are those who consider the emergence of the SpAd, like other communicative 
developments, as merely a product of the broader contextual changes discussed 
above. For instance, Fawcett and Gay suggest a combination of factors which have 
led to the increase in SpAd numbers and influence: "the professionalization of 
politics; a lack of confidence and trust in the permanent civil service; and the need to 
respond to a 24-hour media environment" (2010:37). Wodak argues that in modern 
day (Western) politics: "Spin-doctors have become ever more important, increasingly 
taking on the role of 'mediators'...linking the fields of politics, administration, media 
and so forth" (2011:2). Indeed, several scholars suggest that the SpAd plays a positive 
and important negotiation role in modern democracies, facilitating government 
functioning, particularly in coalitions, and in assisting in the development of robust 
government policy (Connaughton, 2010a; Eichbaum and Shaw, 2005).  
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Secondly, critics have associated the rise in the numbers of SpAds with a culture of 
'government by spin' (Franklin, 2004; Gaber, 2000; McNair, 2007). The role of 
SpAds and their relationships both with GIOs and journalists has received 
considerable attention in recent years, with SpAds being depicted as powerful policy 
influencers, vital news sources and ‘Spin Doctors’ (Negrine, 2008). It has also been 
suggested that it is: "…increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to formally divide the 
'official' work of civil servants from the 'political' work of special advisers" (Fawcett 
and Gay, 2010:49), prompting concerns about the 'politicization' of the UK civil 
service. Thus such a reading of the SpAd role suggests SpAds politicise policy issues 
and therefore promote political agendas at the expense of public understanding and 
transparency. 
 
What is undeniable is that the SpAd role is contentious, fuelled in part, no doubt, by 
the fact that much of what SpAds actually do on a day to day basis, and across 
political systems, remains unclear. Accordingly, some research has more explicitly 
focused on exploring and conceptualising the SpAd role. For instance, Connaughton 
(2010b) proposes four typologies, derived from her study of Ministerial Advisers in 
the Republic of Ireland. Type 1, the expert involves: "assisting with, contesting and 
promoting policy advice in a specific sector" (p.351). Type 2, the partisan, is: 
"appointed predominantly for political association with the minister and in instances 
where there are levels of distrust between politicians and the civil service. These 
advisers are responsive and best placed to anticipate ministerial demands" (p.351). 
Type 3, is the coordinator, which involves: "monitoring the programme for 
government, liaising with various groups and offices to facilitate an oversight of the 
minister's agenda" (p.352). Lastly, Type 4, is the minder: "which emphasises the 
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importance of trust in the relationship between minister and adviser. Minders should 
be looking out for issues that may be potentially harmful to ministers, both politically 
and in terms of reputation" (p.352). Similarly, Maley (2000), in her study of SpAds in 
the Keating Government of Australia, outlines five distinctive policy roles: one, 
'agenda-setting'; two, 'linking ideas, interests and opportunities' (e.g. from their 
minister to broader government agendas); three, 'mobilising' (e.g. building political 
support, driving proposals); four, 'bargaining' (e.g. between themselves and other 
ministers' advisers in relation to policy matters); and five, 'delivering' (i.e. combining 
all the above four tasks to achieve a policy objective/outcome). 
 
Although the above role typologies were derived by focusing on the policy and 
political aspects of the SpAd role, rather than strictly their communication role  
within the political and policy spheres, such studies are useful in analysing the SpAd 
role in Northern Ireland; this article will therefore consider these typologies in the 
discussion section of this article. 
 
1.2 The Northern Ireland Context 
Although there is no one agreed narrative on the cause of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland (Miller, 1994; Roche and Barton, 2013), the major catalysts were 
disagreements on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and accompanying 
issues over ethnic, religious and civil rights and identities. From the partitioning of 
Ireland, into the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in 1921, until March 1972, 
Northern Ireland was governed by a Protestant dominated administration, and as a 
result, Catholics complained of discrimination in basic access to housing, 
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employment, and their ability to influence political elections (Somerville and Kirby, 
2012). This led to widespread public unrest, and ultimately political conflict and 
violence, between 1968 and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998; it 
also meant that Northern Ireland was governed by 'Direct Rule' since 1972, that is, 
administered by the British government from Westminster (Darby, 2003; Rice and 
Somerville, 2013). The Good Friday Agreement was an agreement signed by the 
British and Irish governments and the majority of the Nationalist and Unionist parties 
to signal support for the implementation of a local power-sharing administration in 
Northern Ireland, based on a consociational model and a rejection of the use of 
violence to promote political aims.  
Thus in order to accommodate the polarised (Unionist and Nationalist/Protestant and 
Catholic) communities which make up Northern Ireland, the power-sharing 
government was constructed on a consociational framework. Consociationalism's 
most important contemporary theorist, Arend Lijphart, explains: "Consociational 
democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a 
fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (2008:31). Lijphart (2008) notes 
that to ensure socio-political stability in post-conflict/divided societies, grand 
coalitions between the main groups/communities are the norm, mutual veto is also 
typical to make sure a simple majority is never enough in decision making processes 
and proportionality is usual with representation based on the population and 
guaranteed in political office, the civil service, the police, to ensure widespread 
confidence in emerging civic institutions (Rice and Somerville, 2013; Rice et al., 
2013). Presently, there are five diverse political parties which make up the governing 
coalition and there is no official opposition party: The Democratic Unionist Party 
(British Unionist), Sinn Fein (Irish Nationalist), The Social Democratic Labour Party 
  
8 
8 
(Irish Nationalist), the Ulster Unionist Party (British Unionist), and the Alliance 
Party (cross-community). However, an 'uneasy' peace exists in this current post-
conflict consociational environment. 
 
It should be noted that the role of SpAds in Northern Ireland is different to their role 
in Westminster and other parts of the UK, in regard to their appointment procedures 
and accountability. In the current Northern Ireland Executive, there are nineteen 
SpAds: four each for the First and Deputy First Ministers; and one SpAd each for the 
remaining eleven ministers. Although the Code of Conduct for SpAds in Northern 
Ireland (Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP), 2013) is largely the same as the 
UK Westminster arrangements, it differs in one important respect. The First and 
Deputy First Minister, do not have the ability to authorise or prohibit SpAd 
appointments as would be the case for the UK Prime Minister in Westminster or the 
First Ministers in Scotland and Wales (Gay, 2000). A recent review of the 
appointment of SpAds in Northern Ireland states that: "each Minister, and the 
Minister alone, is the "Appointing Authority" for his/her Special Adviser" (DFP, 
2011:3). Thus, the element of central control and accountability is removed in the 
Northern Ireland governmental context. Moreover, the Westminster Code of Conduct 
For Special Advisers (Cabinet Office, 2010b) was amended to include a clause that 
SpAds: "…are appointed to serve the Government as a whole and not just their 
appointing Minister" (p.1). Gay states that, in light of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition: "this newly-added provision ensures that special advisers are 
serving the interests of the whole Government, regardless of the party affiliation of 
their appointing Minister" (2010:10). However, the Northern Ireland code has no such 
provision. 
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There are three aspects of the Northern Ireland government which make it a 
particularly distinctive political environment. One is that Northern Ireland is a 
devolved polity (some responsibilities of government have been 'redistributed' from 
Westminster to the regional legislature). Secondly, it operates on a consociational 
power-sharing basis. Thirdly, it is a post-conflict environment. This context offers 
scholars a different territory for analysis compared with the vast majority of research 
on SpAds which is focuses on 'normal' majoritarian parliamentary or presidential 
systems. Additionally, while there are claims that consociationalism produces a 
different political sphere to that of such 'normal' democratic governments (Lijphart, 
2008) little research has been conducted on government communication in this 
context, particularly on societies governed by consociational institutions in the post-
conflict phase. 
 
The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the role and key impacts of 
SpAds on Northern Ireland government communication. We examine the roles and 
relationships between those most professionally involved in the process: SpAds, 
GIOs and journalists, and focus on three research  questions: 
 
1) How do SpAds perceive their communication role and their working relationships 
with GIOs and journalists in Northern Ireland? 
2) How do GIOs and journalists perceive their working relationships with SpAds in 
Northern Ireland? 
3) What are the main impacts of SpAds on the communication of government issues 
in Northern Ireland? 
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2. Methodology 
 
Using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques we targeted 
individuals who are involved in the government communication process and who 
could provide data relevant to our research questions (Bryman, 2012; Tansey, 2007). 
The sample consisted of 33 interviewees made up of 9 senior GIOs (69% of the total 
number), 8 SpAds (42% of the total number) and 16 political journalists. All were 
senior level or experienced employees; GIOs interviewed held the rank of Principal 
Information Officer in the civil service and like the SpAds who participated, they 
worked in a number of different departments and spanned all five coalition 
government partners. The political journalists interviewed were from the main press 
and broadcast organizations in Northern Ireland, alongside two experienced 
freelancers. Interview questions focused on probing participants on their daily work 
routines of producing and disseminating government information, and their 
interactions with the other participant groups. McEvoy’s (2006) advice on 
interviewing elites in divided societies was noted and consideration was given to 
framing questions in a manner which avoided inciting political sensitivities or identity 
issues. All interviews were conducted in the participants’ workplaces and lasted 
around sixty minutes; interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed in full.  
 
The analysis of interview transcripts employed a  broad thematic discourse 
framework, where findings were based on the recurrent themes, patterns and 
categories which surfaced in the discourse (Deacon et al., 2007). Conclusions were 
derived by combining and comparing the thematic findings from all participants 
groups (Davis, 2009). In the next section representative quotations from the 
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interviews are presented in italic type and have been edited (i.e. repetitions, stutters 
and non-verbal sounds removed) for ease of understanding, to a narrative form.  
 
3. Findings 
 
3.1 The SpAd perspective  
 
As has been found in other research contexts (Fawcett and Gay, 2010; King, 2003; 
Maley, 2000) the SpAd role in Northern Ireland involves several distinct functions, 
depending on their minister's specific needs and their own expertise. However, a 
recurring finding, was that SpAds' professional ideology was overwhelmingly driven 
by serving their minister rather than public service or departmental service. One 
SpAd commented: 
 
"[a Special Adviser] has to be someone who is completely...committed to the 
minister’s interest and not the department’s interests and there is a difference...you 
know there’s two and a half thousand people or something like that working in [the 
department], there’s only one of them working for [the minister] and that’s me".  
 
The fact that SpAds are personal ministerial appointments, clearly influences the 
values which they (and their ministers) consider important in their role. SpAd 
interviewees unanimously expressed the importance of being in agreement with, or at 
least 'sympathetic' towards their minister's party political values. SpAds' strong focus 
on ministerial service was evident in their descriptions of their role in communicating 
their minister's position:  
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"Everything that goes on around here, whether it’s Executive policies, whether it’s 
presentation of speeches, whether it’s new policy initiatives, whether it’s, you know, 
event organisation, whether it’s out to meet and greet you know I am looking with one 
eye to, where does that leave the...minister’s profile, where does that fit in with a 
communication strategy that we will have rolling forward...that will follow through in 
terms of speeches, press releases, Q and As, meeting and greeting".  
 
Such views have been expressed elsewhere and reinforce the strategic role of the 
SpAd in contemporary democracies (Maley, 2011).  
 
In order to protect their minister's interests, SpAds stressed that sanctioning the 
departmental communication produced by GIOs, was an important part of their role 
in terms of accurately portraying their minister's agenda. For example, one SpAd 
emphasised: "I wouldn’t want anything done or said that would embarrass the 
minister or be contrary to his political values". However, several SpAds explained 
their role in communication in terms of compensating for the impartial nature of civil 
service communication and for the limitations which exist in the Executive 
Information System (EIS). SpAds (and in fact GIOs and journalists) commented on 
the lack of centralisation between departments as a hindrance for communicating via 
the EIS. Several SpAds discussed the 'silo' mentality of the EIS, where each 
department has its own press office, with one naming it: a "replication of the political 
structure which sits above it". They contended that the consociational government 
system results in ineffective and decentralised communication because it facilitates 
competition between ministers from different parties. According to our interviewees, 
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this structure does not enable GIOs to disseminate a clear unified message, as one 
SpAd explains below: 
 
"it’s one thing for a press officer, you know at a UK level, to push a particular line 
and clearly they’ve constraints as well against the opposition, it’s another thing to 
push a particular line against a minister and they’re sitting at the Executive table to 
whom you’re you know at least in part accountable to...So it’s a difficult system to 
operate, I guess like all of that in essence reduces them to, sort of event management, 
and fairly you know mundane press releases...as opposed to a considered 
communications message which sort of sells the overall achievements...and that may 
just be a function of the way government is organised here. Because it’s not like...in 
England where, or [the] UK as a whole where there’s a single party government...or 
a coalition with a single agenda...whenever you’ve four or five parties in the 
Executive, each of whom may have competing interests, it’s hard to get one clear line 
that you know a government press officer is comfortable putting out...it does blunt the 
capacity to deliver that message".  
 
Several SpAds commented that as a result of this situation, the most 'important' 
communication work is often done via the party route. For instance one stated: "most 
of the things which are of any interest…isn’t put out by the government press office. 
You know I would have written it, [the minister] would amend it and then you know 
[it has] gone out through the party".  
 
It seems that Northern Ireland’s mandatory power-sharing government encourages an 
increased caution among GIOs which constrains them from communicating 
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effectively and strategically with journalists on important issues, and some SpAds 
acknowledged that their role in communicating government issues may contribute to 
this restraint. For example, one SpAd suggested the GIO in his government 
department: "may well say that fella tells me what to do, when to do it and how to do 
it"; another said:  
 
"I think they’re [GIOs] much more aware of the need to get out good messages than 
what was the case previously, they’re much more accountable obviously now…in the 
old system [pre-devolution and power-sharing] they didn’t have to work to advisers. 
That might be a sore point". 
 
SpAds are (understandably) concerned with the promotion of a political message, but 
this practice of delivering government communication through party sources could 
quite easily be viewed as a fusion of what should be impartial government 
information with party political communication, and therefore a breach of the 
Westminster model of communication. In addition, there seems to be a distinction 
emerging among SpAds between important political news and less important 
government news. This assessment fuels journalists' own perceptions that the 
'everyday' functioning of government is not actually 'news', with higher news value 
attached to controversial political issues; a situation hardly unique to Northern Ireland 
but nevertheless problematic for democratic institutions (Flinders and Kelso, 2011; 
Wodak, 2011). Moreover, SpAds in Westminster have also been documented as 
controlling departmental communication for political gain (Fairclough, 2000; 
McNair, 2007). But, one could contend that the institutional structures in fact 
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facilitate Special Adviser domination, through the complex political and 
communication system which is perceived as a legitimate basis for this involvement. 
 
With regards media relations, SpAds, and indeed GIOs and journalists, agreed that 
the traditional tensions between government and media actors in terms of access and 
agenda setting (Lee, 1999; Wolfsfeld, 1997) were heightened by the post-conflict 
power-sharing context in Northern Ireland. Several SpAds perceived journalists to be 
"shaped by the conflict" and so perceive journalists' attention to remain skewed 
towards reporting political conflict and constitutional issues over everyday 
government business, and that many actually lacked the competencies to report on 
policy matters. Media coverage of this nature is viewed as particularly detrimental to 
the image of politics in Northern Ireland, given its still fragile peace. Some SpAds 
even suggested journalists act like an unofficial opposition to the government given 
the absence of an official opposition in Northern Ireland's constitutional architecture. 
A typical comment from one SpAd noted:  
 
"the press here, because there’s no formal opposition at Stormont probably take the 
view that they effectively are the opposition. Which creates a culture where people 
tend to think little or nothing’s been achieved which can be a bit damaging for the 
political process…the difference is in the UK as a whole, you would have some of the 
large national papers be broadly sympathetic to one party some sympathetic to 
another, most of them are just generally hostile here".  
 
Such perceptions mean that SpAds carefully select which journalists they disseminate 
information to, creating a group of 'elite' journalists who may be given access to 
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exclusives and 'off the record' briefings. This is either because they are trusted, from 
the SpAd point of view, to be competent and fair, or are viewed as having the power 
to influence the public by virtue of their large public audience (Rice et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, one SpAd admitted: "some will say to me…there’s a golden hierarchy 
here, some people get better access than others and to a certain extent that’s 
probably true". This is a situation which is deeply resented by several journalist 
interviewees. 
 
The consociational structure and post-conflict context produces a particular set of 
communication management issues within the Northern Ireland government. 
Interviewees agreed with Wilford's (2007) sentiment that due to the consociational 
structure of government, departments are operated as 'party fiefdoms'. For this reason, 
and as suggested by SpAds already, it is particularly difficult to communicate a 
cohesive message which is agreed upon by the five parties. SpAds have therefore 
become particularly valued for their inter-party communication role as parties try to 
control communications in the context of a grand coalition (Rice and Somerville, 
2013; Rice et al., 2013). Almost all SpAds explained that a significant part of their 
role involved negotiating agreement with other departments on cross-departmental 
issues. One SpAd explained:  
 
"we are the negotiating contact with other parties...when there’s cross departmental 
issues, where there’s areas of controversy, where there’s blockages, Special Advisers 
are the people that are sent in to try and resolve those issues...that’s how that’s 
worked through day to day issues right through to the big, big peace stuff".  
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These findings are supported by research on other coalition governments where 
political advisers were found to play a negotiating, centralizing role (Connaughton, 
2010a; 2010b; Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010b; Paun, 2011). There are of course 
additional issues to manage in the Northern Ireland situation given that there is a stark 
lack of, as one SpAd put it: "philosophical agreement on many areas". For example, 
interviewees explained that there was a lack of trust between the parties, as 
acknowledged in past research on Northern Ireland (Birrell, 2012; Wilford, 2007), 
and overall a very antagonistic political culture remains in the region. Inter-party 
working cannot however be avoided given there was, as one SpAd noted, an 
"unnatural separation" between departments meaning: "almost everything is cross-
cutting". This was explained by interviewees as necessary in facilitating the various 
political parties in government, in line with the consociational design. Comments 
from SpAds however indicate that this inter-departmental communication between 
SpAds could itself cause problems. A recurring topic was that having eight Special 
Advisers in OFMDFM
1
 slowed down decision making and caused internal wrangling, 
even between SpAds from the same party. In addition, it seems that SpAds can 
contribute to the lack of collective cabinet responsibility and inter-departmental 
working in the Executive by their input into ministerial decisions. For example one 
SpAd explained that he often warned his minister to avoid involvement in 
departmental matters which were not 'his responsibility', in case they resulted in 
negative media coverage which would be associated with the individual minister 
himself. Thus SpAds may at times actually fuel the already antagonistic relations 
between government ministers of different political parties in Northern Ireland, and 
                                                 
1
 Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
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indeed they can play a role in perpetuating the idea that the government department is 
a party fiefdom rather than part of a unified administration. 
 
3.2 Working with SpAds: GIO and journalist perspectives 
 
GIO and journalist perspectives on working with SpAds produced quite different 
perspectives to that of the SpAd, on the SpAd role. GIOs contended that the 
emergence and increasing dominance of SpAds since the devolution of a power-
sharing government, has reduced the autonomy of the GIO role.  This is exemplified 
by the sanctioning of government information which SpAds discussed above. One 
GIO stated: "every media enquiry we receive needs to go through the 
adviser…Nothing goes out without their approval". Another noted: "Whatever he 
says goes, simple as that, I can’t over-rule him". GIOs, as primarily public servants, 
are professionally obligated to uphold political impartiality. SpAds' control over 
departmental information however can limit GIOs' abilities to carry out their public 
service responsibilities and this may strengthen those conflicting loyalties many GIOs 
explained they felt between public and ministerial service. GIOs spoke of the need to 
communicate cohesively: "part of our job is to promote, you know, that [government] 
is working, you know the cohesiveness…that’s part of our job". But, SpAds' focus on 
promoting individual ministerial agendas, may override GIOs' abilities to 
communicate such an impartial and collective agenda. A journalist commenting on 
this situation noted, that while there may be an official government information 
service: "it [the EIS] does the basic press releases and the road safety campaigns and 
the, don’t set fire to your grannies this winter all that sort of stuff but, the really big 
shouts, the really big decisions are invariably taken by the parties". GIOs discuss 
  
19 
19 
their relations with SpAds through the frame of an 'informal hierarchy' (Magee and 
Galinsky, 2008). One GIO explained this as follows: 
 
"your relationship with the SpAd is crucial...if you look at the civil service issue, none 
of them are my reporting line managers...my line manager in [the department] here is 
a policy official...But...you wouldn’t do anything against the advice of a Special 
Adviser or minister...You know we’re public servants after all".  
 
Thus, it seems GIOs accept SpAds’ decisions and operate as if they cannot effectively 
challenge the SpAd, even though the Special Adviser Code of Conduct explicitly 
prohibits them from 'managing' or 'directing civil servants (DFP, 2013). Another GIO 
put it this way: "the Special Adviser will have the mind of the minister better than any 
other civil servant right. So, a Special Adviser can give the press officer like me really 
good advice and say they’ll run with that, he’ll not go with that".  
 
It is debateable whether this kind of interaction illustrates 'advice', or rather 
instruction or permission. This finding arguably bears out Mumby’s analysis of how 
organizational power works. He notes:  
 
"A particular group’s interests will be best served if those interests become part of the 
taken-for-granted social reality that structures organizational life. Once these interests 
become part of the organizational structure, then that structure simultaneously 
mediates in and reproduces those interests" (Mumby, 1988:67).  
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This situation illustrates how occupational identity works to bolster Special Advisers' 
influence by virtue of the associative power which they bestow from their minister 
(Fawcett and Gay, 2010), who now have more influence over organizational decision 
making in Northern Ireland's consociational government, than in pre-devolution times 
(Knox, 2010). It also suggests that formal accountability procedures are not 
necessarily enough to overcome a strong organisational culture in respect to the SpAd 
role and its perceived authority in the Executive (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2006). 
 
Additionally, a number of GIOs complained that SpAds sometimes communicated 
'off the record' with journalists, providing exclusive information, for party-political 
rather than departmental gain. According to GIOs, this means they appear as a less 
valuable source to journalists and hence this undermines their position:  
 
"they would leak an awful lot of stuff that they shouldn’t really leak at all. So, it’s 
unhelpful when they do speak to journalists because I’m in one room trying to sell 
something and he’s in a room just over there talking to the same journalist about 
something else, it makes us look…moronic…but they all do it…it’s just something 
we’re faced with".  
 
Indeed, journalists understand that as close confidants of ministers, Special Advisers 
had more 'inside' knowledge on political issues, and given they were freed  from 
political impartiality restrictions, they could reveal 'political' information which is 
considered more newsworthy. Typical comments were: "they [SpAds] can be very 
useful, if they’ll talk to you about what’s really going on. But civil servants don’t 
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really like them…they get in the way I suppose for the civil servant to get the 
minister’s decision".  
 
These findings diverge from Gaber’s work on the UK Westminster system, where he 
found that: "Journalists speak with senior press officers on much the same basis as 
they speak with special advisers" (2004:368). Moreover, it is obvious from journalist 
comments such as "civil servants don’t really like them…they get in the way...", that 
they recognize a tension between GIOs and SpAds in terms of communicating 
departmental business. 
 
Conversely, the ability of SpAds to override GIOs' dissemination of information also 
affects journalists' access to information. Journalists explained how SpAds have the 
power to 'block' them from accessing information. For example, one journalist stated:  
 
"we were blocked by [names a party] SpAds...a straight forward press enquiry was 
held up for about twelve days...because the civil service press officer had to get 
clearance to release information, straight forward information...the Freedom of 
Information request subsequently showed that the SpAd had vetoed the release of the 
piece...it’s political office at the end of the day, it is the parties who are in charge so 
therefore...even the SpAds are his [GIO's] masters".  
 
Indeed, with regards to the previously noted SpAd contention that journalists behave 
as a political opposition, most journalists disagreed with this claim and many in fact 
commented that SpAds were too quick to use the history of conflict to prevent the 
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media actively scrutinising government functioning in Northern Ireland. One 
journalist summed up this perception: 
 
"they will play the peace process card... say you’re being too negative you’re gonna 
damage this fragile plant that we have carefully nurtured…but you can’t stop asking 
questions just because of that, if...a bit of hard-nosed journalism brings the whole 
thing down then it isn’t very stable to begin with".  
 
There was also agreement among journalists that SpAds were predominantly 
concerned with protecting their ministers, acting as a powerful army. For instance one 
journalist stated: 
 
"Special Advisers would be quite aggressive...in a small country...power and 
influence is disproportionate, so you have to be very careful...these guys are powerful 
people, and there’s a battle there...they [politicians] will use the Special Advisers as 
the attack dogs if you like".  
 
Further, several journalists questioned the dominance of SpAds over the civil service 
in Northern Ireland government given their sometimes limited experience and the 
personal nature of their appointments. The importance of the SpAd role was 
encapsulated by one journalist’s comment, who noted that: "Special Advisers are 
becoming increasingly important and this is something new…they’re becoming more 
professional, more powerful, and that’s one of the most interesting aspects of the way 
our politics is evolving". 
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4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our findings in some ways mirror past research in other political systems. For 
instance, SpAds are primarily concerned with ministerial service, they have become 
dominant figures in government communication, operating as part of an informal 
hierarchy both in influencing GIO work and in journalists' access to government 
information. The findings indicate, that in Northern Ireland's consociational 
government, SpAds occupy the ‘dominant coalition’ (Berger, 2005) in respect to 
government communication. It is important to note that this shift in the balance of 
communicative power from GIOs to SpAds, is most certainly linked to broader 
structural changes resulting from the devolution of administrative powers from 
Westminster to the local Northern Ireland Assembly (Rice and Somerville, 2013). 
Power has moved from civil servants, to ministers and their support network, who 
now have more influence over decision making and organizational matters than in 
pre-devolution times (Knox, 2010). In this sense, Northern Ireland mirrors other 
‘normal’ democratic societies where the increased influence of SpAds has been noted 
alongside the decline in civil service power within political systems (Blick, 2004; 
King, 2003; Winstone, 2003). Therefore, perhaps the growing dominance of SpAds 
may actually be an indication, at least to some degree, of the ‘normalizing’ of 
Northern Ireland’s government system.  
 
To gauge the extent of this similarity to other polities it is worth comparing the work 
of SpAds in Northern Ireland to that identified by research elsewhere. For example, a 
comparison with the research on SpAd ‘role typologies’ (Connaughton, 2010b; 
Maley, 2000) is instructive. While the roles identified by Maley (2000); 'agenda-
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setting', 'linking ideas, interests and opportunities', 'mobilising'; 'bargaining', and 
'delivering' are clearly applicable to varying degrees to the roles of Northern Ireland 
SpAds, in terms of their communicative interaction with GIOs and journalists, 
Connaughton's typologies are particularly useful for comparative purposes. Three of 
Connaughton's four typologies can be recognised in this study of Special Advisers in 
Northern Ireland's Executive, these are: the 'partisan', the 'coordinator' and the 
'minder'; the 'expert' role is not apparent to any significant degree, similar to 
Connaughton's own findings on SpAds in the Republic of Ireland. As Connaughton 
also found in her study, individual SpAds in Northern Ireland often enact a number of 
these roles and do not 'conform to any one type' (p.353). As noted above, SpAds 
describe their own role in terms of the partisan, minder and coordinator (section 3.1). 
Thus, SpAds view their role as promoting their minister's agenda, as protecting their 
minister from reputational damage and, albeit to a lesser extent, as a means of 
coordinating with other SpAds to push through policy or seek inter-party agreement. 
The coordination role does however, seem ultimately to be directed towards 
promoting their ministers' partisan agenda and safeguarding their minister's 
reputation. These roles are linked by Special Advisers to the fraught and complex 
political system in Northern Ireland, which means ministers feel they need particular 
support in promoting their political agenda within a five party mandatory coalition. 
This situation therefore provides additional issues for SpAds working in the Northern 
Ireland Executive, which is discussed further below.  
 
What is more, it is clear that the roles of the SpAd are perceived differently by our 
other participant groups in this study. So for example, while SpAds describe their role 
in terms of the partisan, minder and coordinator, GIOs and journalists talk of SpAds 
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as only partisans and minders (section 3.2). GIOs conceivably come to this 
conclusion as they are often involved in tailoring their work around SpAds' ideas of 
ministerial preferences and they witness SpAds' partisan input into the 
communication of policy. Likewise, journalists understandably view SpAds as 
partisan minders, because they largely interact with SpAds when they are trying to 
access information about ministers and their departments, which the SpAd can either 
facilitate or block, to protect their minister; or when they are receiving a clearly 
partisan perspective or positive account of a minister's/department's work. In 
Northern Ireland, GIOs or journalists do not appear to understand, value, or even 
perceive the coordination role of the SpAd, a role which SpAds themselves consider 
to be of central importance. 
 
While there are some similarities with Connaughton’s (2010b) findings on role 
typologies, it is clear that Northern Ireland’s political context and  its consociational 
governmental structure makes government communication, and the role of the SpAd 
within this, particularly complex. We see that in addition to the government 
communication structure established as a result of consociationalism, SpAds' political 
loyalties can at times hinder GIOs' abilities to impartially and strategically 
disseminate information on policy issues from government departments. SpAds 
'compensate' for the EIS system, by essentially overriding it, and use the political 
structures as legitimisation for this action. For this reason, unlike SpAds, senior GIOs 
in Northern Ireland are not usually viewed by journalists as valuable information 
sources. However, SpAds and journalists, both view each other as 'shaped by the 
conflict' and this increases the traditional suspicion in their relationships, perhaps 
contributing to the tight control SpAds assert over government communication, and 
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therefore GIO work. At the same time, there is a consensus across the SpAds we 
interviewed that in Northern Ireland they play an important mediation role in 
facilitating inter-departmental/inter-party engagement and in working through the 
ongoing post-conflict issues which remain unresolved in the power-sharing 
administration.  
 
There are several institutional and cultural explanations for these findings. The 
emergence of departmental party fiefdoms has resulted in ongoing competition 
between ministers and departments. This is understandable on a political level given 
the remaining distrust between parties and the recognition that voting remains 'tribal' 
in Northern Ireland (Evans and Tonge, 2009). Indeed, perpetuating the deep 
community divisions in Northern Ireland may be considered vital by some parties for 
their longevity and their re-election prospects (Rice and Somerville, 2013). The 
media then arguably reinforce this division by sometimes focusing on partisan 
political issues at the expense of more mundane government communication, to fulfil 
perceived news values. The problems of inter-departmental frictions which have been 
found even in the UK Westminster system (Gaber, 2004; Gregory, 2012), are 
intensified by, as one GIO put it, the 'built in flaws' of the Executive Information 
System which is arranged around the consociational multi-party political structures. 
The result is that SpAds seek to protect their minister's 'fiefdom' and yet are often 
vital in facilitating cross-party communication. They are not, however, formally 
required to serve the whole power-sharing government, as in the UK (Gay, 2010). 
They compensate for what they view as the ineffective EIS system by sanctioning 
departmental communication and strategically disseminating information and by 
liaising with journalists themselves, primarily for ministerial and political gain. 
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SpAds perhaps take a more direct role in disseminating departmental information 
than in other political contexts because of the consociational structure of governance 
in Northern Ireland and the lack of inter-party collaboration in the post-conflict 
environment. Simultaneously, journalists often neglect GIOs in favour of SpAds who 
have the power to speak more freely. Thus the influence of SpAds impacts 
detrimentally both directly and indirectly (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2008), on GIOs' 
abilities to communicate a cohesive and impartial government message to the public.  
 
These developments are important issues to consider in debates about democratic 
accountability and the role of government communication within this. The idea of an 
impartial civil service communicating with society in a transparent manner is a key 
component, at least in theory,  of the Westminster democratic model. Our GIOs spoke 
of a sense of responsibility to the public in terms of informing citizens impartially on 
government matters and even in facilitating a transition to a shared society. However, 
clearly a situation where government communication is dominated by SpAds with a 
party political agenda, and the consequent devaluation of the GIO role is potentially 
harmful for public access to transparent, politically impartial information (Rice and 
Somerville, 2013). There is also a danger that the day to day communication of the 
important policy work that goes on in the power-sharing government may be 
displaced by the cultivation of controversial issues and antagonistic politics. As other 
studies have argued (Flinders and Kelso, 2011) this may have a detrimental effect on 
the public’s view of government, despite the fact that building public engagement is 
arguably even more important in a society recovering from a violent conflict. A lack 
of unified and politically impartial communication from government may result in 
sustaining and even increasing division, and detract from the trust citizens have in 
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government institutions to deliver collective societal improvements (Gormley-Heenan 
and Devine, 2010). 
 
Eichbaum and Shaw's comments seem to be pertinent to the Northern Ireland context, 
when they state: "Clearly, in some jurisdictions...the constitutional context, and 
specifically a transition to multi-party Government, opens up institutional spaces 
that…political staff in particular, may be required to fill" (2010c:199). However, the 
SpAd role in Northern Ireland is complex in that they at times encourage inter-
departmental competition by way of their strong focus on ministerial priorities and by 
their power to dominate departmental decisions. On the other hand, they play an 
important role in coordinating inter-departmental policy issues and in maintaining the 
multi-party government coalition. SpAds are therefore paradoxical political actors in 
Northern Ireland, they are important in maintaining the very existence of the 
Executive, but do little to combat the overall lack of collaboration between the parties 
and the consequent silo approach to public communication (Rice and Somerville, 
2013).  
 
Our findings highlight that when theorising and analysing the Special Adviser role, it 
is essential to take account of the particular political context and inter-party dynamics 
in which SpAds operate, and also the perspectives of other political actors with whom 
SpAds regularly interact. This study illuminates the issues which a consociational 
system and post-conflict context produce for the role of SpAds in government 
communication, and thereby addresses the wider democratic implications of 
government communication for a post-conflict society. Indeed, we suggest that the 
SpAd role is a good indication of the kind of problems which exist in post-conflict 
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consociational democracies and scholars may learn a considerable amount about the 
functioning of these institutions by examining the communicative role and 
relationships of SpAds.  
 
In conclusion, we call for further research into the communication role of SpAds in 
post-conflict, consociational democracies and indeed other complex political 
contexts, in order to assess the extent to which constitutional architecture and political 
culture impacts upon the role of the SpAd, and vice versa. Previous theoretical studies 
on SpAds (e.g. Maley, 2000; Connaughton, 2010b) usefully conceptualise their roles 
in terms of their policy and political tasks and responsibilities. While they do consider 
party composition of government and the majoritarian-coalition distinction, these 
studies do not focus in detail on the political structures of the polities in which SpAds 
operate, or explicitly consider the centrality of communication to the typologies 
which they identify. The line of inquiry pursued by this paper, with its focus on the 
communication role of SpAds does, we contend, contribute to the more 
comprehensive theorising required in order to understand the role of these important 
political actors. The findings from this study are particularly significant at a time 
when we see coalition, consensus and consociational governments increasing 
throughout the world (Hueglin, 2003).  
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